Kamen. Empire: How Spain Became a World Power, 1492-1763

Kamen, Henry. Empire: How Spain Became a World Power, 1492-1763.

Harper Collins: New York, 2003.

Henry Kamen, the great contrarian of Hispanist historiography, has in Empire yet another revisionist work to place on the shelf next to his equally iconoclastic treatments of the Spanish Inquisition, Philip II de Habsburg, and Philip V de Bourbon. He addresses a long-standing historiographical trend that stretches all the way back to the era in which the House of Habsburg ruled in the Iberian peninsula. The conventional wisdom is that in 1491 Spain was a mighty and vigorous young nation, filled with hope and surveying unlimited opportunities. A sudden series of seemingly miracles developments—the discovery of the New World, the conquest of the Indies, and the inheritance of Charles V—eventually revealed themselves to be albatrosses around the neck of the Spanish people. Flanders, Burgundy, and Milan became perpetual drains on the finances of the Crown and graveyards for generations of peninsular men, while the silver of the Indies turned Spaniards into idle conquerors who spurned productive work. In a true historical paradox, Spain’s strength had weakened her; her wealth, impoverished her; her victories, defeated her. This view first gained currency among Spaniards themselves (the arbitristas, who demanded reform and regretted the existence of the overseas empire) in the mid-16th century but eventually was co-opted by historians. It is the venerable edifice that Kamen assails.

Kamen argues that Spain was not the victim of her empire, but instead became a “great power” by exploiting and leeching off of its imperial possessions with hitherto unparalleled greed. Not only were severe taxes levied upon the subjects of Spain; what the Spaniards themselves called “Spanish” victories were fought with foreign troops, while Spanish fleets were guided by foreign pilots and Spanish riches were unearthed by slaves and Indians to be transported by non-Iberian Europeans and sold to North European creditors. The Spain of 1898, broken and wretched, was the only Spain that had ever been. Its weakness had only been concealed by its reliance on its European and overseas empire.

Closely linked to this argument is another major points Kamen makes. Even when Spain was at her zenith, her greatness was always held up by her subjects and her paid servants. Americans may be tempted to believe that the “privatization” of warfare is a novel creation, but Kamen’s work reminds us that it is the professional standing army that is a relative newcomer to the world of warfare. With a seemingly never-ending series of vignettes and statistics, Kamen shows that in Spain’s triumphs of arms, of exploration, and even of culture, non-Spaniards almost always constituted the majority. The Spanish Empire was a collaborative effort, created and sustained by Europeans of all nationalities as well as American Indians, Africans, and Asians. It was a truly multinational empire, even if its metropole was weak.

As always, Kamen’s writing is sharp and his body of evidence impressive. He makes his case in magisterial fashion, although his argument seems to be a bridge too far. While it is true that the Battle of San Quentin was not a uniquely Spanish victory, and that Columbus was Italian, Kamen neglects the reality of the 15th, 16th and 17th centuries. What was true of Spain’s reliance of subjects, foreigners, and mercenaries was also true of all European powers operating before the advent of the assumptions of the Age of Nationalism. If it was truer in degree of Spain, it was because of relative power compared to her contemporaries, and, therefore, of her greater number of enemies.